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Introduction 
 
The protracted conflict in Sri Lanka remains one of the world’s most intractable. The 
ongoing Norwegian-backed effort to resolve peacefully one of South Asia’s longest wars 
is, as the time of writing, bedevilled by fresh acrimony and antagonism between the Sri 
Lankan state and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), sometimes referred to as 
the ‘Tamil Tigers.’ Since tensions in the Tamil-dominated areas of the island erupted into 
open confrontation between several armed groups and the state in 1983 in the wake of the 
fiercest anti-Tamil rioting since independence from Britain, the fighting has grown in 
intensity and affected most of the Northeast. Inevitably, the origins, nature and character 
of the conflict are contested by the protagonists and other actors. But the two 
protagonists’ rationale for their actions generally falls within two predominant 
explanatory frameworks. The LTTE says it is spearheading an armed struggle for political 
independence for the Tamils as a response to institutionalised racism and violence against 
the Tamil people by a Sinhala-dominated state. In short, it is waging a ‘liberation 
struggle.’ The LTTE describes itself as a ‘national liberation movement deeply embedded 
in [the] people, articulating the wishes and aspirations of the Tamil nation.’1 On the other 
hand, describing itself as a democracy, the Sri Lankan state denounces the LTTE’s 
violence campaign as a challenge to its authority, unity and territorial integrity. The state 
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is ‘fighting terrorism.’ Thus, the state’s military response is rationalised as necessary to 
‘destroy the terrorists’ and ‘break the back’ of terrorism.2 
 
While the narratives presented by the LTTE and the state in support of their respective 
positions are complex and range across a number of issues, this paper is primarily 
concerned with the politics of the terrorist label as applied to the LTTE. To be clear, it 
does not set out to answer the question as to whether the LTTE is a terrorist organisation 
or not, but instead to demonstrate how the state’s characterisation has impacted on the 
conflict in Sri Lanka. The article begins by pointing out that the terrorist label has been a 
central feature of Sri Lankan political discourse for several decades, irrespective of the 
strength of violent challenge to the state. Secondly, we outline how the Sri Lankan state 
has deployed the label of terrorism to further its strategic aims in the domestic and 
international spheres. Thirdly, we contend that the ascription of terrorism has not 
necessarily impeded the LTTE’s organic growth in terms of its military capability but has, 
by denying the organisation international legitimacy, undermined its political project. 
Fourthly, we outline the contradictions between present international attitudes to 
terrorism and the conduct of key international actors in regard to the conflict in Sri Lanka. 
Finally, we argue that in the context of its armed forces’ failure – and perhaps inability - 
to defeat the LTTE, the state’s sustained rhetoric of terrorism has become a serious 
impediment in reaching a permanent resolution of the conflict. Beginning with a brief 
outline of the Sri Lankan conflict, the article then turns to each of these issues in turn. 
 
Context 
 
In early 2002, a long running but low key Norwegian initiative to bring about a negotiated 
solution to the conflict in Sri Lanka began in earnest with the establishment of an 
internationally monitored cease-fire. The truce brought to an end the most intense phase 
of the conflict - seven years of pitched battles between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan 
armed forces. The armed struggle for independence launched by the LTTE and other 
Tamil armed groups in the late 1970s escalated in 1983 following the widespread anti-
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Tamil riots in the capital Colombo and other parts of the island in July that year. Despite 
three attempts at negotiations – in 1985, 1989-90 and 1994-5 – fighting between the 
LTTE (which emerged on top from a series of internecine battles amongst the Tamil 
groups in the late 1980s) and the state’s armed forces had gradually escalated in both 
intensity and scope. An estimated ninety thousand people, mainly civilians, have been 
killed and a million others internally displaced or made refugees. 
 
Since its inception in 1972 as a small group of fighters, the LTTE had, by the turn of the 
century, expanded into a substantial military organisation, fielding several thousand 
fighters in set piece battles with the state’s (also expanded) military and backing them 
with heavy artillery and a large naval force. 3 By the time the cease-fire came into effect, 
the LTTE was claiming control of over 70 per cent of the predominantly Tamil areas of 
the North and East (though not the five main population centres, which remain under 
government control). The LTTE has built a civil administration structure in the areas it 
controls, including a police force, a justice system, and humanitarian assistance arm. It 
operates a taxation system, both in territory under its control and government-held areas, 
and a customs regime at ‘borders’ defined by the frontlines.4 Since the late 1990s this 
civil administration has developed to an extent it has been described as a de-facto state.5 
 
The LTTE has expanded its political presence since the advent of the peace process. Even 
before the truce began, Sri Lanka’s four largest Tamil political parties forged a coalition 
with a manifesto of recognising the LTTE as the ‘sole representatives’ of the Tamil 
people.6 In parliamentary elections held in April 2004, the Tamil National Alliance 
(TNA), campaigning as self-acknowledged ‘proxies’ of the LTTE, swept the polls in the 
Northeast, securing 22 seats. From September 2002 to March 2003, the LTTE engaged in 
six rounds of high-profile talks with the government. The negotiations were chaired by 
Norway and held in Thailand (September, October, January), Norway (December), 
Germany (February) and Japan (March). The LTTE withdrew from the talks in April 
2003 protesting the government’s failure to implement agreements already reached. 
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Efforts to restart negotiations have been unsuccessful, and at the time of writing, although 
the truce is holding, strains are deepening. 
 
A pivotal device 
 
Even before the advent of Tamil militancy, the term ‘terrorism’ had entered Sri Lanka’s 
political discourse in the wake of the brief but bloody insurgency launched by the Marxist 
Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP) against the state in 1971. Notably, the JVP 
membership was almost entirely made up of Sinhalese youth - an estimated ten thousand 
of whom perished in the state’s crushing response. Despite occurring on a much smaller 
scale to the JVP insurgency and involving a handful of political killings and other 
relatively small acts of sabotage, Tamil militancy in the 1970s was already being 
described domestically, and in some cases internationally, as ‘terrorism.’ The introduction 
of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in 1979, formalised the language of terrorism 
and, as detailed below, conflated terrorism with the Tamil political project in Sri Lankan 
political discourse. By the time Tamil militants staged the attack on armed forces that led 
to (and was even cited as a cause of) the anti-Tamil pogrom of July 1983, the discourse of 
terrorism was well-entrenched. For example, President Jayawardene’s call in June that 
year on Sinhalese to ‘do their bit’ to fight terrorism was typical of the language used to 
describe Tamil militancy: ‘We are in the throes of increasing terrorist activity in the 
north… The Tigers are getting bolder and bolder. Hence I appeal to the nation not to 
allow terrorism to take root in other parts of the country.’7 At the international level, this 
characterisation of Tamil militancy as terrorism was quickly adopted by some Western 
states – in contrast, for example, to India.8 
 
How this early language of terrorism developed, and its impact on the conflict, can best 
be understood by looking at the historical and wider discursive contexts in which it took 
place. For a start, it is important to note the process by which ethnicity has been 
essentialised in Sri Lanka, such that major actors within and outside Sri Lanka have come 
to understand the conflict through a certain framework. The process by which this 
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essentialisation has taken place, eloquently described by Ronald Herring, has had wide-
ranging impacts on the politics naming of the LTTE.9 Similarly, these politics must be 
considered in the context of the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state addressing three separate 
audiences: Tamils, Sinhalese and the international community (including other 
governments, international non-governmental organisations, and the media). Although 
somewhat crude, this typology helps explain why the politics of naming has evolved. 
 
When several Tamil armed groups emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s to mount a 
violent challenge the Sri Lankan state, they did so in a context of acute ethnic polarisation 
in the island’s politics and a sense of victimisation by the state amongst Tamils. Indeed, 
the growth of a Tamil political community was conditioned by rising concern about 
Sinhala dominance in the island’s governance in the wake of Ceylon’s independence from 
Britain in 1948. Tensions between Tamils and Sinhalese became serious in 1956 after the 
election victory of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), the implementation of the 
‘Sinhala Only’ policy and the first ethnic riots. An ethnic fault line at the centre of the 
island’s politics was crystallised: ‘Tamils and Sinhalese [became] dangerous shorthand 
devices for politically complex communities’ and the essentialising of ethnicity – ‘to 
speak of Tamils as a whole and Sinhalese as a whole’ – fed into the stereotyping 
strategies of chauvinists.10 
 
The growth in Tamil militancy in the late 1970s also took place in the context of growing 
Tamil agitation for self-determination. Indeed, the call for an independent state of ‘Tamil 
Eelam’ was a central plank of the newly formed Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) 
that swept the parliamentary elections in the Tamil dominated districts of the North and 
East in 1977. At this time, armed Tamil groups were arguably marginal in the politics of 
Tamil independence, which was dominated by the TULF. Apart from being numerically 
small – which only changed, albeit rapidly, following the anti-Tamil pogrom in 1983 – 
the groups followed, initially at least, in the wake of the TULF in pursing the goal of 
Tamil Eelam. 
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The state’s response responses to these two developments – the Tamil call for secession, 
led by the TULF, and the sporadic violence of the armed groups – are critical to 
understanding the trajectory of ethnic relations and the conflict in Sri Lanka. The United 
National Party (UNP) government of President Jayewardene conflated the two issues 
through an ‘incremental reframing of secessionist protest in Jaffna as terrorism’ and, in 
turn, ‘terrorism in the late 1970s and early 1980s became conjoined with Tamil ethnicity.’ 
Most importantly, ‘Once the political demands of Tamil youth were perceived in terms of 
terrorist threat, mirror images of ethnic entities hardened.’11 
 
The proscription of the LTTE and other armed Tamil groups in May 1978 and the 
enactment of the PTA in July 1979 suggest the emphasis placed on the ascription of 
Tamil militancy as terrorists by the Sri Lankan government. At that time, there was 
incongruence between the scale of Tamil militancy and the scale of the government’s 
discursive and military response. The LTTE’s own ‘diary of combat’ lists only a handful 
of small-scale attacks in the years before 1983 and the LTTE was only officially blamed 
by the state for only one political assassination – in 1974 – in the lead up to the 
proscription and the PTA. In contrast, the proscription of the JVP, which has staged a far 
more spectacular insurgency by then, did not take place until July 1983, and even then 
only after the JVP performed well local and presidential elections.  
 
Shortly after the PTA was passed a substantial military force – made up overwhelmingly 
of Sinhalese personnel – was dispatched to the North. Ensuing reports of human rights 
violations were widely publicised by international human rights groups and frequently 
raised with the government by aid donors, particularly the Nordic countries and Canada. 
However, simultaneously, ‘there was a certain amount of rallying around the state’ by 
international actors and ‘despite harsh international criticism, the regime continued to 
garner critical external support in the aggregate.’ Amid the economic hardships of the late 
1970s and early 1980s, ‘the [subsequent] escalation of the conflict created scapegoats for 
mass frustration and at least some perception among the Sinhalese majority that ‘our 
government’ is besieged by Tamil insurgents and deserves support.’ Much of this was in 
7 
the context of the pro-West regime’s enthusiasm for liberalisation and donors’ ‘holistic’ 
approach in using the ‘nation-state’ as the unit of analysis, thereby masking ‘internal 
differentiation experienced by real people on the ground.’12  
 
In short, deploying the rhetoric of terrorism had three distinct benefits for the Sri Lankan 
state: it de-legitimised (Tamil) agitation for political independence (with which terrorism 
had been conflated) thereby enabling the ‘securitisation’ of the issue; it mobilised Sinhala 
sympathy for the regime and its actions; and, international criticism of rights abuses 
notwithstanding, did the same abroad. These dynamics were amplified in 1983, a year 
widely considered a watershed in Sri Lanka’s ethnic relations and conflict.  
 
The road to war 
 
The consequences of the conflation of ethnicity and violence (‘Tamil terrorism’) by the 
state, particularly in the context of long-standing and now serious communal antagonism, 
were inevitable. As we noted above, whilst Tamils and Sinhalese were politically 
complex communities, they came to be referred to as monolithic wholes. Crucially, the 
militants and the state also came to be viewed as genuinely representing Tamils and 
Sinhalese political interests respectively. In particular, despite political disagreements 
within each community, the leadership of the other was accepted. The state played a 
crucial role in this by publicly adopting a partisan role as leaders of the Sinhalese in their 
conflict with the Tamils. President Jayewardene’s declaration, weeks before the events of 
July 1983, is a typical example: 
 
‘I am not worried about the opinion of the Tamil people... now we 
cannot think of them, not about their lives or their opinion... the 
more you put pressure in the north, the happier the Sinhala people 
will be here... Really if I starve the Tamils out, the Sinhala people 
will be happy.’13 
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Another important response by the state was to prohibit the espousal of separatism. This 
manifested itself most clearly in an amendment to the Sri Lankan constitution in 1983 
that foreclosed a debate on the central Tamil demand and compelled the TULF’s MPs to 
resign their seats. The amendment deemed: 
 
‘No person shall, directly or indirectly, in or outside Sri Lanka, 
support, espouse, promote, finance, encourage or advocate the 
establishment of a separate state within the territory of Sri Lanka.’ 
 
In the wake of the July 1983 pogrom and this criminalisation of Tamil secessionist 
demands, the ethnic conflict escalated sharply. The Tamil militants’ call for armed 
struggle for political independence struck a chord amongst Tamils. Several Tamil militant 
groups expanded rapidly, drawing recruits and financial support from the Tamil 
community, both in the island and from the diaspora. The scale and frequency of guerrilla 
attacks on security forces rose rapidly, mainly in the Jaffna peninsula but in other parts of 
the Northeast as well. The conflict has continued since, apart from a few months in 1990-
91 and 1994-5. The guerrilla war of the 1980s gradually changed to one in which both the 
LTTE and the state controlled different areas of the Northeast and launched full scale 
military offensives against each other. 
 
These developments, however, have not been translated into changes to the discursive 
context, which remains one of ‘liberation struggle’ versus ‘terrorism.’ Here, it is useful to 
turn to the three separate audiences (Tamils, Sinhalese and the international community) 
that the state and the LTTE were addressing. Domestically, the label of terrorism, though 
prevalent, became relatively meaningless. It was understood by both Tamils and 
Sinhalese as part of the state’s criminalisation of Tamil agitation for political 
independence/autonomy. As such, neither the Tamil militant groups nor the ‘Sinhala’ 
state seriously sought to convince the ‘other’ community of the legitimacy of their 
respective causes. Indeed, it was a decade later that the state, amid a new counter-
insurgency strategy, altered its rhetoric to differentiate ‘LTTE terrorism’ from ‘Tamil 
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terrorism.’ Just as the Sinhala perspective saw militant violence as conducted on behalf of 
and endorsed by the independence-seeking Tamils, Tamils saw violence by the state 
security forces as conducted on behalf of and endorsed by the domineering Sinhalese. 
 
Meanwhile, press coverage of the July 1983 pogrom and the sudden exodus of refugees to 
nearby India and Western countries raised the international profile of Sri Lanka’s ‘ethnic 
problem’ – as did the sharp escalation of the conflict after July 1983. The rhetoric and 
logic of terrorism therefore became a key part of the international legitimacy of the state 
and its actions. This, combined with the domestic redundancy of the term, has shaped the 
discourse of terrorism in Sri Lanka from the outset and to the present. In short, both the 
state and the LTTE deployed and contested the label in any seriousness only in the 
context of shaping international opinion. 
 
International centrality 
 
Sri Lanka’s long running conflict has sometimes been described, erroneously in our view, 
as ‘the forgotten struggle.’ The island’s location astride the Indian Ocean sea routes and 
proximity to India, the regional superpower, has always ensured a degree of international 
attention, not least New Delhi’s. India’s ill-fated intervention in 1987 to enforce the Indo-
Sri Lanka pact resulted in thousands of casualties. Sri Lanka’s ‘internal’ conflict is 
affected by international developments in several ways. Firstly, Sri Lanka’s economy has 
failed to fulfil its potential as a consequence of the conflict and international financial 
assistance is vital to the state’s functioning. Moreover, the economy is reliant on foreign 
markets, both for its export income and for remittances from migrant workers and 
expatriates. For its part, the LTTE has an extensive fundraising network amongst the 
Tamil diaspora, made up in large part by refugee and conflict-related flows into countries 
such as Canada, the United Kingdom (UK), Switzerland, France, Australia and India.14 
Secondly, the central political issue of the conflict, which both protagonists agree is the 
demand for political independence, makes the international community important actors 
in the ‘internal’ conflict. It is in these contexts that international interpretations of the 
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conflict become central to the protagonists’ strategic objectives. The legitimacy of the 
LTTE’s armed struggle – and hence the label of ‘terrorism’ – is at the centre of this 
interpretive contest.  
 
Here, there are some important parallels to the conflict in Bosnia. As David Campbell 
demonstrates for that conflict, ‘the settled norms of international society were … 
complicit and necessary for the conduct of the war itself.’ Two predominant views of 
what the war in Bosnia was about are evident: ‘[the Serb view] is the tale of a civil war in 
which antagonism between various groups emerged for a variety of reasons. The [Bosnian 
government view] is of international conflict, in which aggression from one state 
threatens another.’  ‘In their interpretation of the conflict, [the international community] 
adhered to a limited range of representations. Moreover, they are representations that 
have had more in common with the Serbian position than that of the Bosnian 
government.’  This had a direct impact on international efforts to resolve the conflict and 
on the way it was reported on by the international media. Not least, the logic of ‘warring 
factions,’ ‘ancient hatreds’ and ‘civil war’ and a rejection of the ‘genocide’ claim 
precluded international enthusiasm for directly supporting the Bosnian government. 
Campbell demonstrates that the ‘local’ narrative which becomes accepted by international 
actors can be expected to drive their policies.15 
 
As such, successfully ascribing or resisting the label of terrorism is thus the most 
important ideational objective in the international arena. For the LTTE, it is the notion of 
a civil/ethnic war narrative that can best segue into the arena of national liberation and 
political independence. For the state, it is the notion of terrorism that paves the way for 
both strong military action and non-engagement with its opposition’s political demands. 
In the mid-1980s, for example, the LTTE rationalised its armed struggle in the framework 
of self-determination of the Tamil people: ‘Our struggle is for self determination, for the 
restoration of our sovereignty in our homeland. We are not fighting for a division or 
separation of a country but rather, we are fighting to uphold the sacred right to live in 
freedom and dignity. In this sense, we are freedom fighters not terrorists.’16 Moreover, the 
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LTTE, along with other Tamil groups, argued resistance to state terrorism: ‘under 
conditions of national oppression and the intensification of state terrorism and genocide 
against our people, the demand for a separate state became the only logical expression of 
the oppressed Tamil people. Our armed struggle is the manifestation of that logical 
expression.’17 The state also appealed to the internationally accepted principle of stability. 
As National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali argued ‘no country in the world has 
succeeded by being soft on terrorism.’18 
 
What’s in a name? 
 
A cursory survey of international responses suggests neither narrative has been accepted 
in its entirety. The LTTE has been proscribed under anti-terrorism legislation by the 
United States (in 1997), UK (in 2001) and India (in 1991). Other countries, such as 
Australia and Canada (both in 2002), have proscribed its fundraising activities. The LTTE 
has not always been proscribed in Sri Lanka: a ban was imposed in 1978 and lifted in 
1988 to permit negotiations; then re-imposed in January 1998 and lifted in September 
2002, again ahead of negotiations. Yet, despite these proscriptions, the internationally 
backed Norwegian peace process is based on a parity between the protagonists – not least 
the tacit acceptance in the cease-fire agreement of two separate controlled areas 
demarcated by a frontline - at least in so far as the negotiation process is concerned. For 
its part, the Sri Lankan state is being compelled to negotiate with the LTTE and hence 
recognise it. Moreover, international pressure is impelling the state towards a domestic 
anathema - a political solution to the conflict based on autonomy for the Tamil areas, 
albeit short of independence.  
 
If the objective of the Sri Lankan and international proscriptions of the LTTE were to 
undermine the organisation’s (military, political and administrative structural) growth, 
they have been demonstrable failures. Evicted from its stronghold of Jaffna in a Sri Lanka 
Army (SLA) offensive in late 1995, the LTTE retreated to the Vanni jungles and in 1996-
8 was forced to defend itself against a series of further SLA offensives. The imposition of 
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the US ban in October 1997 coincided with the largest military operation ever mounted 
by the SLA. Sri Lanka’s 1998 proscription occurred amidst widespread belief the LTTE 
was on the point of collapse. However, in late 1999, the LTTE launched a series of 
counteroffensives that not only recaptured the territory it had lost since 1996 but also 
overran the SLA’s largest base complex located at the neck of the Jaffna peninsula. The 
defeats prompted the state to scramble for international assistance – which proved 
forthcoming - to prevent Jaffna falling again to the Tigers. Moreover, in the fighting of 
2000 and 2001, the LTTE, unveiling a significant new conventional military force, 
seriously damaged the SLA’s offensive capability. In mid-2001, the LTTE launched a 
major attack on Sri Lanka’s sole international airport-cum-airbase in Colombo, 
destroying several military jets and airliners of the national carrier. The subsequent 
increases in insurance premiums on air and sea movement, and the decline in tourist 
arrivals, had a detrimental effect on the Sri Lankan economy, contributing to the first 
annual contraction since independence. 
 
The military outcomes and, most importantly, the scale of these battles suggest the 
international and domestic proscriptions have failed to undermine the LTTE’s ability to 
recruit and raise funds. Yet, the timing of Sri Lanka’s ban and the US proscription 
suggest they were less intended to weaken the LTTE – which at the time was considered 
on the verge of defeat any way – than in undermining its political project, namely Tamil 
political independence. The US designation of the LTTE as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization (FTO) is particularly important in this regard, given the ban is intended to: 
‘stigmatize and isolate designated terrorist organizations internationally,’ ‘signal to other 
governments [US] concern about named organizations’ and ‘deter donations or 
contributions to and economic transactions with named organizations.’19 Given that the 
LTTE was not known to have a significant fundraising presence in the US and an 
acceptance amongst US security analysts that the LTTE does not pose a threat to US 
interests, the FTO designation’s political impact assumes much greater significance 
internationally.20 As US Secretary of State Colin Powell put it, ‘[we] consider terrorism 
to be unacceptable, regardless of the [underlying] political or ideological purpose.’21 
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Part of the explanation for the proscription of the LTTE by the US and other states has to 
do with the challenge that the LTTE’s political project of establishing an independent 
state rather than, say, the direct threat the LTTE poses to their national interests. No 
country has recognised the claim for Tamil self-determination.22 As Adrian Guelke points 
out, there is a latent international resistance to the ‘universal’ principle of national self-
determination, particularly when it leads to independence.23 Guelke also notes the great 
powers would accept secession ‘when it is limited to sub-units of states, with the further 
conditions that the right is exercised through the ballot box and [that minority rights are 
protected]. Rejected, at least in principle, will be the carving out of new political entities 
by the use of force.’24 Furthermore, while political violence is ‘self-legitimizing when 
applied to autocracies,’ the conventional wisdom rules out the legitimacy of political 
violence in democracies: ‘democracies are seen to provide dissenters with peaceful ways 
to achieve their ends. Political violence is less likely because there is no ‘need’ for it.’25 
The US State department, meanwhile, describes Sri Lanka as ‘democratic republic with 
an active multiparty system’ – even as it admits ‘institutionalized ethnic discrimination 
against Tamils remains a problem.’26 
 
The question as to whether the LTTE is or is not considered a terrorist group by Western 
governments has not discernibly diminished its support base within the Tamil diaspora. 
On the contrary, the proscriptions may even have consolidated the resolve of the Tamil 
diaspora organisations in supporting the Tamil nationalist project and the LTTE.27 
Certainly the Tamil diaspora has lobbied hard in support of the LTTE, especially in the 
lead up to the US and UK proscriptions, even going as far as leading a legal challenge 
against the former.28 The LTTE has itself also been manoeuvring diplomatically and 
politically to shake off, or at least cast doubt on, the terrorist tag.29 Meanwhile, sections 
of the Sinhalese diaspora, supported by the Sri Lankan state, have also been involved in 
campaigning against the LTTE.30 
 
Contradictions 
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The LTTE is thus at the centre of several paradoxes in prevailing international norms. 
Despite increasingly hostile international attitudes to political armed struggles – many of 
which are now framed by the discourse of terrorism – negotiation, rather than a military 
solution, is deemed the appropriate response to the LTTE’s challenge to the Sri Lankan 
state. The LTTE has been banned in several countries, but negotiations with the Sri 
Lankan government brokered by Norway are proceeding on the basis that it represents 
Tamil political interests. The US and the UK are actively promoting the negotiations 
between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state, implicitly recognising the LTTE as the 
appropriate party to negotiate the terms of a Tamil region’s autonomy within Sri Lanka. 
Their allies like Germany, Japan and Thailand have hosted the talks, whilst 
simultaneously supporting the ‘war on terror’ in other arenas. Following the LTTE’s 
declaration in December 2002 that it was prepared to explore federalism as a possible 
solution to the conflict, LTTE delegations have toured a number of countries, including 
France, Spain, Switzerland and South Africa to examine constitutional models and 
governance arrangements. Many important states (such as the UK, China, Germany, Italy 
and Japan) and international organisations (such as the World Bank, Asian Development 
Bank and several United Nations agencies) have, since the 2002 cease-fire, established 
diplomatic contacts with the hitherto ostracised LTTE. Whilst this demonstrates an 
increasing willingness on the part of these actors to see beyond the terrorist label in the 
case of the LTTE, even amid reports it continues to develop its military (‘terrorist’) 
capability, limits on interactions between the LTTE and international actors remain. The 
willingness of many actors to interact with the LTTE, even on ‘universal’ matters of 
human rights and humanitarian affairs, remains conditional on the Sri Lankan state’s 
approval. Furthermore, international funding for rehabilitation work in LTTE-controlled 
areas remains controversial, despite guarantees of transparency via international auditing, 
because some donors are uncomfortable directing funds through a ‘non-government’ 
entity.31 
 
In the meantime, the labelling of the LTTE as a terrorist organisation can be seen to be 
impacting on efforts to resolve Sri Lanka’s conflict in several ways. On the one hand, 
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some argue that it was the inclusion of the LTTE in the US FTO list amid the 
international ‘war on terror’ that has compelled the LTTE to enter the peace process. 
Whilst there is an element of truth in this, the effect of international pressure cannot be 
overstated. The argument that the LTTE is forced into talks also ignores the considerable 
benefits that accrue to the LTTE from the peace process, not least its ability to consolidate 
its gains in the last round of fighting, its much easier access to supporters SLA-controlled 
areas and its increased exposure to the international community.  
 
On the other hand, the proscriptions undermine the negotiation process in several ways. 
The availability of ‘neutral’ venues is limited, with those countries hosting talks 
unabashedly contradicting the norms of the ‘war on terror.’ With regards to formulating a 
new Constitution that settles the political question, the LTTE’s access to constitutional 
knowledge is also restricted by its characterisation as a terrorist organisation: the US has 
suggested a federal model like its own might be appropriate for Sri Lanka, but LTTE 
officials seeking to study it cannot visit the US, or for that matter go to Canada. The 
undertaking of humanitarian activities to deliver the ‘peace dividend’ to the people of the 
Northeast – something universally recognised  as necessary to build support for the peace 
process – is problematic because the interactions between donor agencies and the LTTE’s 
civil administration may be seen to constitute ‘economic transactions’ a terrorist 
organisation under the foreign proscriptions. 
 
These contradictions in international attitudes and practices raise important questions. If 
Western states are serious about defeating what they see as terrorism through the use of 
legal and military force, then the LTTE appears an important exception. If, however, the 
US-led ‘war on terror’ actually allows for more nuanced and gradual modes of conflict 
resolution, as appears to be underway in Sri Lanka, then it begs the question as to whether 
anything has really changed. Guelke’s argument that ‘the weaker the credibility of 
international norms, the more likely that the outcome will be determined by the balance 
of forces within states and that the international community will be compelled to 
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recognise (and thereby legitimise) whatever has been created on the ground - even if 
violence has played a large role in its determination’ comes to the fore here.32 
 
But it is within the island of Sri Lanka that the rhetoric of terrorism has truly emerged as a 
serious impediment to peace. The deliberate conflation of ‘terrorism’ and the Tamil 
political project by successive Sri Lankan governments has produced a political culture in 
which the main (Sinhala) parties routinely vie to adopt more hard-line positions on the 
‘ethnic question’ – a practice which began as long ago as 1956. As a result, a 
government’s readiness to compromise at the negotiating table can easily result in its 
electoral defeat – as the United National Front (UNF) administration that signed the 
cease-fire with the LTTE discovered in the elections of April 2004. The hard-line rhetoric 
from both sides of the political fence in Colombo, meanwhile, compels the LTTE to 
adopt an equally intransigent position at the table, not least to maintain its credibility and 
support base. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As we have seen, the politics of naming the LTTE has been an important feature in Sri 
Lanka for several decades, with important discursive and even material impacts. 
Domestically, these politics should be seen in the context of the essentialisation of ethnic 
politics and the conflation of the Tamil political project with terrorism. Moreover, the 
incorporation of the logic of ‘fighting terrorism’ into Sri Lanka’s mainstream politics has, 
along with the inevitable outcome of elections in a divided population, reduced what 
ought to be serious debates on the constitutional structure of the country into an emotive 
and dangerous war of words. In short, using the politics of terrorism, the Sri Lanka state 
has managed to mask the broader questions at the heart of the conflict. Not only has this 
framework made the conflict intractable, its continued prominence does not augur well 
for a permanent political settlement of the conflict. 
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Internationally, the LTTE has been designated by foreign states as a terrorist organisation, 
usually through its inclusion in lists of proscribed organisations in recent years. However, 
the attitudes of foreign states have more to do with their disapproval of the LTTE’s 
political objective of establishing a separate Tamil state than with the perception that the 
LTTE represents a direct security threat to their national interests. In recent years, despite 
official proscription and a growing international ‘war on terror’, foreign states have 
shown that they are willing to work with the LTTE in shaping a political solution to the 
conflict. Taken together, these developments suggest that, while the label of ‘terrorism’ 
continues to be applied domestically and internationally to describe the LTTE, the politics 
of naming have not necessarily impeded the international community’s pragmatic 
approach to conflict resolution in Sri Lanka.  
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